Roman Yuneman — Ex-сandidate in Moscow City Duma Elections from Electoral District 30
Electronic Voting: Risks and Vulnerabilities
Electronic Voting: Risks and Vulnerabilities
Implementation of the electronic voting system is an impetus for administrative intervention in the elections.
In our report, we describe the first experiment on electronic voting in Russia, along with the risks we may face in the future. The investigation was carried out by a team of experts, headed by Roman Yuneman.
In our report, we describe the first experiment on electronic voting in Russia, along with the risks we may face in the future. The investigation was carried out by a team of experts, headed by Roman Yuneman.
Electronic Voting: Risks and Vulnerabilities
Implementation of the electronic voting system is an impetus for administrative intervention in the elections.
In our report, we describe the first experiment on electronic voting in Russia, along with the risks we may face in the future. The investigation was carried out by a team of experts, headed by Roman Yuneman.
In our report, we describe the first experiment on electronic voting in Russia, along with the risks we may face in the future. The investigation was carried out by a team of experts, headed by Roman Yuneman.
Main conclusions
Electronic voting was used at the Moscow City Duma elections in 2019 for the first time in Russian history. This system was implemented at electoral districts: 1, 10 and 30.
Despite e-voting as a concept gained its popularity in different states, its implementation faces problems almost everywhere.
In Moscow the hybrid system for e-voting was maintained by the user interface, the backend of which was on Moscow Government servers, along with the blockchain.
The system of e-voting was implemented barely after six month of its introduction to the public.The system was developed by Moscow IT Department, not by election commissions.
The system was used in the elections, despite failures during tests and its flaws.
The experiment on its implementation failed
on election day — September 8
on election day — September 8
the system was not working or was having failures (4 hours out of 12)
>30% of the time
>1000 people
faced difficulties with voting due to technical issues
E-voting results were significantly different from traditional voting and influenced the election results in the 30th district
– On electronic polling stations, government-favoured candidates received a result which was higher in 1.5-2 times.
Many voters were not able to vote or were unsure of the result of their vote
We received more than 70 feedbacks from voters who experienced problems with e-voting.
– In the 30th district, the opposition candidate won on traditional polling stations, while the administrative candidate won on electronic polling stations.
E-voting was used for an administarive intervention in the elections
– More than 53% of voters in the 30th district were employees of government-financed organizations.
– Employees of government-financed organizations were obliged to vote.
– A week before the vote, employees of government-financed organizations were also obliged to register new accounts on the Public services electronic portal, so that they could take part in the e-voting.
– Employees of government-financed organization are sure that management knows how they voted.
– The system is not protected from registration from fake accounts. Collusion of the Moscow City Election Commission and Moscow IT Department is enough for that.
– Voter's vote was not protected from external control.
– Personal data of voters were leaked on the Internet.
New electronic methods for driving and controlling public sector employees have created a hybrid system of administrative intervention in the elections
E-voting results were significantly different from traditional voting and seriously influenced the results of the elections
Download full report
Roman Yuneman
Follow us on social media
Ex-сandidate in Moscow City Duma Elections from Electoral District 30
Contact us!
